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vs .. 
HA~Y OSMUS, N0.-7t52 · 
· _Pefendant and Appella~t. 
"''.• . .. 
BEN JA.b4IN SPENCE_. . 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
FAY WALKER OSMUS, . 




Defendant and Appellant. 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff as respondent herein commenced the above 
entitled action in the District Court of the Third Judicial Dis-
trict, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, against the 
defendant on the 14th day of March 1947 praying for separate 
maintenance; pursuant to stipulation entered by attorney for 
plaintiff and defendant the court made and entered its order 
herein requiring the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum 
of $25.00 per week as temporary support money commencing 
on the 15th day of July 1947 and to pay to her attorney the 
sum of $50.00 on or before the 1st day of August 1947, pending 
said action. 
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On July 21, 1947, the defendant filed his answer and cross 
complaint in said action praying for a divorce and praying the 
court enter an amount for the support of his children and for 
general relief. 
On August 24 ,1947 the plaintiff filed an amended com-
plaint setting forth some additional facts, but still praying for 
a decree of separate maintenance and support money, attorneys 
fees, a general accounting of his earning and for general relief. 
On October 7, 1947, the plaintiff then filed her second 
amended complaint, in said action praying for a decree of 
divorce, custody of the three minor children; for the sum of 
$250.00 per month for the support of said children and herself 
and for her court costs herein and for general relief. 
On the same day the defendant filed in said action his 
written entry of appearance and waiver, consenting that the 
court m.ay enter his default in said action provided the court 
would not grant a sum in excess of $250.00 per month for 
alimony and support money, and on the same day the court 
heard said matter and the default of the defendant was entered 
by the court and the decree _of the court was then entered, 
wherein the plaintiff was granted an interlocutory decree of 
divorce, the custody of three minor children with right in the 
defendant to visit with said children at reasonable times. The 
decree further provided that the defendant was to pay to the 
plaintiff the sum of $100.00 per month as alimony, and the 
sum of $50.00 per month for each of the said minor children 
and that the first payment of $250.00 was to be paid within 
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ten days from the entry of said decree and that the court retain 
jurisdiction of said matter for all purposes. 
. Since the entry of the order of the court on the 15th day 
of July 1947, requiring the defendant to pay to the plaintiff 
the sum of $25.00 per week as temporary support money, and 
the entry of the decree of divorce on the 7th day of October 
1947, requiring the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum 
of $250.00 per month as alimony and support money, the 
defendant has paid to her the sum of $50.00, (Tr. 7). 
On the 18th day of December 1947, the court entered its 
order herein requiring the defendant to appear in court on the 
22nd day of December 1947, at the hour of 10 o'clock A. M. 
on said day to show cause, if any he has, why the court should 
not make and enter its order herein punishing the defendant 
for contempt of court fo~ his wilful failure to comply with 
the decree of the court, and why he should not pay to the 
plaintiff what is due and owing to her under the terms of said 
decree and for attorneys fees. That said order was issued 
pursuant to the affidavit of the plaintiff (R-39) stating that 
the defendant had paid her nothing but $50.00 since the 15th 
day of July 1947! that he was able-bodied and steadily em-
ployed and capable of complying with the decree of the court. 
In answer thereto the defendant filed a petition for modi-
fication of decree, (R-42) stating among other things that he 
was not able to pay the sum of $250.00 or anything in excess 
of $25.00 per week at a later date. 
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On the 22nd day of December 1947 a hearing was had 
on the issues involved, and the court made and entered its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and order in said 
action, finding the defendant in contempt of court for his 
wilful failure to comply with the decree of the court and pro-
nounced judgment upon him that he be confined in the County 
Jail for a period of 25 days (R-46 to 49), from which order 
the defendant appeals to the Supreme Court. 
ARGUMENT 
The only argument the defendant contends for is that he 
was not able to comply with the order of the court in the pay-
ment of $250.00 per month to the plaintiff and he has, in his 
brief, set forth several cases that hold in substance that: 
"Under the authorities cited and the uniform holdings 
of the courts, it is prerequisite in contempt proceedings 
of the nature here under review to an order committing 
to jail that the one charged should be found able to 
comply with the court's order, or that he had intention-
ally deprived himself of the ability to comply with such 
order." 
Hillyard vs. District Court, 68 Utah, 220. 249 Pac. 806. 
With the foregoing doctrine the plaintiff agrees, but it is 
the contention of the plaintiff that the defendant "had inten-
tionally deprived himself of the ability to comply with such 
order.'' 
The defendant testified that up to the 15th day of February 
1947 he was working for D. F. Anderson making as high as 
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$800.00 per month (Tr. 4) when he lost his job. Since that 
time he states he has not worked except for a Mrs. Carlson at 
63 73 So. State St., and that he was working for her since May 
1947, for his board and room. He was living at Mrs. Carlson's 
in Sandy, Utah (Tr. 2) (Tr. 4 & 5). Defendant further testi-
fied that he had been keeping company with Mrs. Carlson be-
fore and after his divorce (Tr. 7). Upon redirect examination 
the defendant was asked: (Tr. 21) "Isn't it a fact you are more 
interested in Mrs. Carlson here than you are in her business or 
your future welfare?" Answer: "Yes, sir." He further testi-
fied that he is capable of making $8.00 a day as a Fry Cook but 
that he would work for Mrs. Carlson for his board and room 
because she promised him an interest in her business (Tr. 10) 
(Tr. 6). They had not been making any money in this busi-
ness and in fact running behind (Tr. 6) and yet he was satis-
fied to go along with Mrs. Carlson and let her keep him by 
furnishing him board and room rather than get out and work 
for himself or for his family. He was able-bodied and capable 
of working, except he states that he was temporarily disabled 
because of his shoulder (Tr. 11). He was content to let his 
wife and three children, one of whom is an invalid (Tr. 26) 
live on relief and let the County Welfare Department take 
care of them (Tr. 22) and to further work for his board and 
room so that he could be around the woman he cares for, 
rather than do anything for his wife and three children. De-
fendant further testified that he had made no effort to find 
work in Salt Lake because he had outstanding bills against 
him and he was afraid his creditors would be after him (Tr. 
5) . He was not interested in his forme~ wife, the plaintiff, or 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
his children. He made no effort to even see them although 
he was given the privilege of visiting with the children at 
reasonable times and had not seen them since July 1947 
(Tr. 20). 
The plaintiff and defendant had a substantial interest in 
a fine home which the plaintiff was compeled to sell in order 
to save the equity they had in it (Tr. 23). She recovered 
$5,000.00 on it. She spent some $3,000.00 between the time 
she sold it and the time she purchased an equity in another 
home on which she paid $2,000.00, all the money she had left. 
The defendant contends she had sufficient money to live on 
and that apparently was an excuse for him not to pay her any-
thing. She testified she was under heavy expense and had to 
spend some $3,000.00 for the support of herself and children 
which the defendant contends is unwise and extravagant. She 
explained what she did with this money (Tr. 24). She had to 
have a home for her children and she did the best she could with 
what she had. The defendant rendered no help to her or his 
children or to provide a home or support for the children and 
now he complains of her extravagance. Let him try to keep 
three minor children, some of whom were sickly and invalid, 
living at a hotel and paying medical care for them and see if 
he could do better with the money she had. We think this 
is no excuse for his failure to offer some supervision for his 
children and their welfare. He merely told her she could live 
on that (Tr. 26) and made no further effort to help her. 
The defendant cites the case of Selph vs. Selph, 231 Pac. 
921, Arizona in the following language: 
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"The law does not require impossibilities, but it does 
exact good faith and an honest and conscientious effort 
to perform its orders and decrees. 
It has been held too that an inability to pay alimony 
brought about by the defendant's own act for the pur-
pose of avoiding its payment may be punished for 
contempt.'' 
and justifies himself by saying that it was impossible for him 
to comply with the decree of the court. We may agree that 
he could not pay the money to. the plaintiff when he would not 
work, but we certainly do not agree that he was acting in good 
faith and an honest and conscientious effort to perform its 
orders and decrees and we further contend that his inability 
to pay the money to the plaintiff was brought about by his own 
acts for the purpose of avoiding its payment. Defendant's own 
testimony and demeanor before the court bears this fact out 
and it was, without doubt, the reason the court held the de-
fendant in contempt of court. 
In the defendant's assignment of error No. 2 he contends 
the court should have modified the decree by reducing the 
alimony and support money because of the defendant's inability 
to pay same and has cited a number of cases in support of this 
contention. 
We agree that the law he cites is good law but not ap-
plicable to the instant case. The decree in this case was entered 
by the court upon the stipulation of the defendant that the 
court award not more than $250.00 per month; $100.00 as 
alimony and $50.00 per month for the support of each child. 
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The court had a perfect right to assume the defendant was 
able to pay this on his own stipulation (R. 27) and the fact 
that he had been making $800.00 per month. The court had 
nothing further before it. If he was able to pay this out of his 
ability to earn such an income, $250.00 was not excessive for 
a wife and three children, who needed the constant care of 
their mother. The defendant now comes before the court 
and contends that he cannot make that and that he signed the 
stipulation and waiver upon the advice of his attorney. This 
appears to be a flimsy excuse at this time. That matter should 
have been raised before the court made its findings of fact and 
decree in the main case. 
Our courts have repeatedly held that: 
·'To entitle a party to modification of a decree there 
must be change of circumstances. Chaffee vs. Chaffee, 
63 U. 261, 225 Pac. 76. 
and the court has upheld this strictly in a number of cases, some 
of which are as follows: 
Carson vs. Carson, 87 U. 1. 47 Pac. 2nd 894. 
Cody vs. Cody, 47 U. 456. 154 Pac. 952. 
Sandall vs. Sandall, 57 U. 150, 193 P. 1093. 
Tribe vs. Tribe, 59 U. 112, 202 Pac. 213. 
There was no change of circumstances in this case. If 
anything, the changed circumstances were on the part of the 
plaintiff wherein she was worse off than when the decree was 
entered. I do not think it is necessary to go into this matter 
further for the reasons mentioned herein and the law in such 
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cases. An action in equity may be the proper procedure in 
such a case to show that the decree was inequitable and 
impossible of performance, but to attack the matter by a pe-
tition to modify where no changed circumstances exists since 
the entry of the decree is unjustifiable and we think the ruling 
of the court in denying this modification was entirely justified. 
Herzog vs. Bramel, 23 Pac. 2nd 345 at 347. 
We think the plaintiff in every essential has complied with 
the law in bringing this proceeding before the court by the 
facts that she sets up in her allegations contained in her affi-
davit (R. 39) and in the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law and decr~e of the court (R. 46 to 49) in accordance with 
the law in Parish vs. McConkie 35 Pac. 2nd 1001 and in ac-
cordance with the following: 
Herzog t-'S. Bramel, 23 Pac. 2nd 345 at 347, wherein the 
court held: 
"Under the statutes and codes sililar to ours, we think 
it is generally recognized that the enforcement by cita-
tion or an order to show cause or by contempt proceed-
ings, or orders or decrees with respect to the payment 
of monthly or other specific periods of alimony and 
counsel fees, for a failure and a wilful refusal to pay 
the same, is one of the inherent equity powers of the 
court. 
Had the plaintiff by her petition merely averred the 
existence of the decree, the allowance of alimony, 
counsel fees, and costs, the ability of the defendant to 
comply therewith, demands made of him to do so, and . 
his failure and wilful refusal to comply therewith, 
without averring or referring to the alleged fradulent 
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and void contract or settlement entered into subsequent 
to the decree, and by citation or order to show cause or 
by attachment of the person of the defendant sought 
the enforcement of the decree, the jurisdiction of the 
court to entertain the petition and proceed with the 
cause rna y not well be doubted.'' 
all of which we think the plaintiff has complied with and the 
findings of the court that the defendant herein was able to 
comply with the court's order, or that he had intentionally 
deprived himself of the ability to comply with such order, was 
justified, and the order of the court finding the defendant in 
contempt of court and the imposition of sentence should stand. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BENJAMIN SPENCE, 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
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